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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 
15645 
ALBERT TAYLOR, 
Defednant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT Of THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (i) (a) (ii) (1953), as amended, 
distribution of a controlled substance (heroin) for value. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury before the 
Honorable Ronald o. Hyde in the Second District Court of 
Weber County and found guilty of distribution of a 
controlled substance for value. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and 
judgment of the lower court. 
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Respondent has submitted two separate briefs in 
response to Case Nos. 15631 and 15645, consolidated on 
appeal by defense counsel. Differences in facts and legal 
issues have requi~ed a complete separation of the two 
cases. Respondent respectfully requests the indulgence 
of the Court in submitting its case in this manner. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The essential differences between this case 
and Case No. 15631 are: 
(1) Sale took place on October 4, 1977 (as opposed 
October 10, 1977). 
I 
( 
(2) Site was appellant's house (as opposed 
Holiday Inn). 
to Ogden[ 
I 
( 3) Appellant denies that the transaction ever 
occurred. 
(4) Case was tried before a jury. 
At about 2:00 a.m. on October 4, 1977, 
Annette Stubbs telephoned appellant to arrange for a buy 
of two balloons of heroin (T.72-73). The substance of 
that conversation was: 
"A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I called Albert Taylor. 
And where did you call 
Albert Taylor? 
At his home. 
What time did you call 
Albert Taylor at his home? 
-2-
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
About 2:05. 
A.m? 
Yes. 
Did anyone to your knowledge 
answer the phone at Albert 
Taylor's house? 
Yes. 
Who was that? 
His grandmother. 
Was Albert home? 
Yes, he was. 
Did he come to the phone? 
Yes, he did. 
And what i·f anything did 
you say to Albert when he 
came to the phone? 
I asked him if he would get 
me two bags of heroin, and he 
said he could. And I told him 
if he would let me shoot one, 
I'd walk with one. 
Okay. Starting out first of 
all with the two bags, why did 
you ask for two bags? 
Why did I ask for two bags? 
Uh, huh. 
To make a case. 
Okay. Was there any other 
conversation with Albert Taylor 
on the night other than, 'Can you 
get me two bags of heroin?' 
No. 
When you called him? 
No. 
Did you promise to do anything 
in return for his getting you 
these bags of heroin? 
I told him I would give him $5.00. 
Okay. Now who brought up the 
$5.00? 
He asked me for it on the telephone. 
He asked you for $5.00? 
Yes, he did. 
Were there any other promises other 
than monetary promises made for the 
heroin? 
No." (T. 73-74). 
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Ms. Stubbs further testified that she recognized appellant's 
voice on the telephone from having known him before (T. 76). 
This telephone call was witnessed by three police officers 
(T. 72). 
Ms. Stubbs was strip searched, given $60.00 and 
proceeded by cab to appellant's house at 217-30th, Ogden 
(T. 76-78). One officer was placed in front of the house and 
another in the alleyway in the rear to observe. 
Ms. Stubbs approached the rear door of the house 
and knocked. Appellant answered the door. Ms. Stubbs 
testified: 
"A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I walked in, and we went back to 
his bedroom, and he asked me if I 
had the money, and I then handed 
him two 20's and two lO's. 
All right. What is the very 
thing that he said to you at 
time that he opened the door 
recall? 
first 
the 
if you 
He asked me for the money. 
Is that the first thing that he said?: 
Yes. 
Okay. 
Yes, I 
I 
And you handed him the money? I 
did." (T.79). 
Ms. Stubbs was given two balloons by appellant. 
; 
She injectec1 
·a I Stubbs pal : one and "walked" with the other (T.81-82). Ms. 
$65.00 to appellant (T.82), presumably $60.00 for the heroin 
I 
and $5.00 for the "finder's fee" requested by appellant on ! 
the telephone (T. 7 4) • Ms. Stubbs left through the front aoor 
and returned by cab to meet the police officers (T.85- 86)· 
She gave the officers one empty and One f ull balloon (T.B
6). 
-4-
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Officer Gerald Burnett testified that he observed 
appellant's house and Ms. Stubbs' entry and exit from the 
house (T.157-158). Officer Bob Searle observed Ms. Stubbs' 
entry from the rear of the house (T.182-183). 
Appellant testified in his own behalf and denied 
that the sale occurred as related by Ms. Stubbs (T.225). 
He testified that he talked to Ms. Stubbs in the house on 
that occasion, but that no sale-took place (T.226). 
Appellant's testimony was followed by rebuttal 
witnesses who testified concerning the arrest of appellant 
and his possession of heroin on November 9, 1977. 
The jury found appellant guilty of distribution 
of heroin for value. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE POLICE AGENT WAS NOT AN ACCOMPLICE 
BECAUSE SHE DID NOT DISTRIBUTE A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE. 
Respondent incorporates herein by reference the 
argument of the State under Point I of the companion case 
hereto, State of Utah v. Albert Taylor, No. 15631. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPED BECAUSE 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW 
THAT HE WAS PREDISPOSED TO C0Mr-1IT THE 
CRIME. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(3) (1973), permits a 
-5-
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defendant to raise the defense of entrapment even though 
he has denied that he committed any act whatsoever. Thus, 
while there exists evidence to show that appellant did 
commit the act, as the jury found at trial, the rebuttal 
to the defense of entrapment proceeds irrespective of 
the existence of an actual sale. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1) (1973), states: 
--
" (l) It is a defense that the 
actor was entrapped into committing 
the offense. Entrapment occurs when 
a law enforcement officer or a person 
directed by or acting in co-operation 
with the officer induces the commission 
of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for 
prosecution by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offense would 
be committed by one not otherwise ready 
to commit it. Conduct merely affording 
a person an opportunity to commit an 
offense does not constitute entrapment." 
(Emphasis added.) 
This statute has been construed by this Court to 
embody the "subjective" test of entrapment, also known 
as the "innocence" or "origin of intent" test. State v, 
Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975). The subjective test 
focuses on the innocence of the individual or the pre-
. · h · under this disposition of the person to commit t e crime. 
theory, if the evidence shows that the defendant had 
tendencies to commit the crime absent any police activity 
or had formed the intent within his own mind, then he 
cannot raise the affirmative defense of entrapment. 
-6- I ,.. 
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With the exception of two dissents by Justice Maughan 
arguing for the objective test, the subjective theory 
has received repeated approval in Utah. State v. Curtis, 
supra; State v. Bridwell, 566 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1977); State 
v. Casias, 567 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1977). The position of this 
Court reflects the approval of the subjective test by the 
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Russell, 
411 U.S. 423 (1973), approving several earlier entrapment 
decisions. 
Respondent contends that in the instant case, 
appellant was predisposed to distribute heroin for value. 
The facts showed Albert Taylor to be familiar with heroin 
buys. Appellant admitted he was a heroin user (T.224). 
He also admitted he had acquired heroin for Ms. Stubbs 
before (T.257). When appellant was arrested on November 9, 
1977, he had narcotics in his possession. The transcript 
further reveals that appellant needed little or no informa-
tion from Ms. Stubbs concerning the purchase of two balloons. 
Her testimony was that the very first thing appellant asked 
was, "Where's the money?" (T.79). These indications of 
predisposition preclude a subjective finding that appellant 
was entrapped. 
In State v. Casias, supra, this Court stated that 
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entrapment was a question of fact for the trier of fact, 
the jury in the instant case. Determination in finding 
that the defendant in Casias was predisposed to distribute 
marijuana for value was the fact that Casias "was acquainted 
with and engaged in an illegal activity." Id. at 1099. 
Appellant in the instant case was equally well acquainted 
with the heroin activity in Ogden. He had purchased heroin 
for Annette Stubbs previously (T.257). Appellant readily 
responded to Ms. Stubbs' phone call seeking a "buy." 
Appellant was subsequently caught with more narcotics and 
other "dummy balloons" in his possession. The dummy 
balloons containing coffee and sugar, according to 
appellant's own admission (T.256), were full. The 
possession of these dummy balloons raises the inference 
that appellant was contemplating "burning" (selling them 
to someone who believed they contained narcotics) someone. 
, In short, respondent maintains that appellant 
was not the mere innocent friend induced into doing 
something foreign to his own prior behavior, as he main-
tains throughout the course of his testimony. Under the 
Casias fact determination standard of predisposition, 
appellant was not entrapped. 
-8-
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The case of State v. Curtis, supra, is remarkably 
similar to the case at bar. In Curtis, the defendant was 
accused of selling amphetamines to a female undercover 
agent. The defendant testified that he provided the drugs 
only as a favor to the agent, Ms. Stout, and would not 
have procured the drugs but for the close personal and 
sexual relationship that had developed. Brief of Appellant 
at 3, State v. Curtis, supra. This Court, Justice Maughan 
dissenting, found that the facts indicated a predisposition 
of the defendant to commit the crime and stated: 
"In that regard, we make these 
brief comments: despite defendant's 
concession that 'during March and 
April of 1974 he was continously 
procuring drugs for Ms. Stout ••• , 
he urges that it is not shown that 
he was habitually selling drugs. 
Concerning his contention that he 
was providing the drugs merely to do 
'favors' for Ms. Stout: this might 
test the credulity of even the most 
trusting, when it is realized that 
in each transaction the drugs were 
sold for money~ and that the price 
he exacted for the drugs in the 
transaction of which he was convicted 
was $100." Id. at 747. 
Even though appellant denies that the act 
occurred, the circumstances of the instant case are clearly 
similar. Respondent contends that Curtis should control 
this court's determination of entrapment in this case. 
By emphasizing the relationship that had existed 
between appellant and Ms. Stubbs, the amount of money 
spent on this operation and by citing several cases focusing 
-9-
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on police behavior, appellant is attempting to inject 
an objective element into the subjective entrapment 
analysis approved by this Court. The actions of the 
agent and the police are irrelevant when it is shown 
that an individual is predisposed to commit the crime 
charged. Annette Stubbs did no more than present 
appellant with an opportunity to commit the crime. 
The opportunity was, of course, tailored in such a 
manner as to be credible to the appellant. It would be 
ridiculous to expect a stranger to confront a heroin 
seller, pay sixty dollars and walk away with two full 
balloons of heroin on the first try. Law enforcement 
officers must be afforded enough flexibility to establish 
believable, effective drug enforcement operations that 
do not trap the innocent and naive. See, generally, 
Annots., 22 ALR Fed. 731; 62 ALR 3d 110. No extraordinary 
inducement was used in this case. No sexual favors were 
promised; no possibility of a renewal of the old relation-
ship between appellant and Ms. Stubbs was ever suggested. 
Ms. Stubbs did not coerce appellant into making the sale. 
In State v. Soroushirn, 571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 19??), 
this Court found such an entrapped defendant. Soroushirn, 
a Persian college student in Logan, Utah, buying a small 
amount of marijuana, is not on the same level as appellant, 
a long-time Ogden resident trafficking in heroin and 
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possessing other narcotics and dummy balloons (T.265). 
Respondent submits that appellant's claim of innocence 
and naivete "test(s) the credulity of even the most 
trusting," in the words of Justice Crockett in Curtis, 
supra. 
POINT III 
EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION OF HEROIN 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF THE 
CRIME CHARGED WAS PROPER REBUTTAL 
TO THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT. 
Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence, states: 
"Subject to Rule 47 evidence 
that a person committed a crime or 
civil wrong on a specified occasion, 
is inadmissible to prove his 
disposition to commit crime or 
civil wrong as the basis for an 
inference that he committed another 
crime or civil wrong on another 
specific occasion but, subject to 
Rule 45 and 48, such evidence is 
admissible when relevant to prove 
some other material fact including 
absence of mistake or accident, motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge or identity." 
Under this rule, this Court has permitted 
evidence of other crimes to be admitted as rebuttal to 
the defense of entrapment. State v. Perkins, 19 Utah 2d 421, 
432 P.2d 50 (1967); State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 495 
P.2d 1265 (1972). In Perkins, prior sales of marijuana by the 
defendant on January 28, 1965, February 2 and 6, 1965, and 
March 27, 1965, were allowed in to rebut the defense of 
-11-
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entrapment related to a sale taking place on March 28, 
1965. This Court stated: 
"The evidence regarding prior 
contacts between the agent and the 
defendant was competent to rebut the 
claim of entrapment. It was offered 
to enable the jury to determine 
whether the defendant was an innocent 
person whose mind was being influenced 
by suggestions of the agent or whether 
he had a disposition to deal in 
narcotics when the proper situation 
arose." Id. at 52. 
In the instant case, the other crime occurred 
some 35 days after the date of the offense charged. The 
fact that the other crime occurred after the crime charged 
should not remove it from the rule of Perkins and Kasai, 
supra. 
In United States v. Rodriguez, 474 F.2d 587 
(5th Cir. 1973), a sale of cocaine occurring twenty days 
after the crime charged was allowed in to rebut entrapment, 
the court stating: 
11 
• evidence of a similar 
offense, committed in close proximity 
of time, may be corroborative of a 
prior or subsequent offense. Although 
evidence introduced in a criminal trial 
generally should relate only to the 
specific offense charged, prior or 
subsequent incidents may be introduced 
to establish that a defendant possessed 
a requisite knowledge or that there ~s 
consistent pattern, scheme of oper~t1ons, ) 
or similarity of method. 11 (Emphasis added. 
See also 61 ALR 3d 293, 320. The close proximity of the 
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other crime, whether prior or subsequent to the crime 
charged, still serves the purpose of aiding in the 
determination of predisposition. 
Appellant suggests that the subsequent 
act is too remote. In Perkins, supra, this Court 
permitted evidence of act more than two months apart 
from the crime charged. Respondent contends that 
thirty-five days is sufficiently proximate to ensure 
reliability in determining predisposition. This 
similar crime of possession of heroin was 
closely related in nature to distribution of heroin for 
value. Because of this relation and its close proximity 
in time, the admission of this act was proper rebuttal 
to appellant's defense of entrapment. 
CONCLUSION 
The subjective theory of entrapment is the 
current standard by which this Court and the United 
States Supreme Court determine whether or not an innocent, 
otherwise law-abiding citizen has been trapped by over-
zealous law enforcement methods. Respondent maintains 
that the evidence in the instant case shows that 
appellant was predisposed to commit the crime; furthermore, 
the police methods used, while technically irrelevant, 
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would not have endangered an innocent citizen's rights. 
In view of the foregoing reasoning and authority, 
respondent urges that this Court affirm the ruling of 
the lower court and find appellant guilty of distribution 
of a controlled substance for value. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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